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Intertemporal choice is a decision-making dilemma related to outcomes of different entity
located at different time points. Economic and psychological literature on this topic showed
the phenomen of temporal discounting, i.e., the proclivity to devalue the outcome distant
in time on the basis of the time delay necessary to obtain it. The goals of this research are
to investigate two different components of intertemporal choice separately, namely time
and outcome, in school-age children, and the possible link among such components and
the security of attachment style and theory of mind. Ninety one children aged between 6
and 10 years performed two intertemporal choice tasks, first and second order false belief
tasks and the Separation Anxiety Task in the Family and School versions. Results showed
that the two components of intertemporal choice (waiting tolerance and sensitivity to
delayed outcome) are stately interrelated; the quality of the attachment to the family
caregiver affects the tolerance to waiting time and first order false belief understanding
affects both the components of intertemporal choice.
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INTRODUCTION
In everyday life people often face the choice to forgo an immedi-
ate benefit to get a bigger benefit later. This phenomenon has been
named intertemporal choice, i.e., a decision-making dilemma
related to benefits or outcomes of different entity located at dif-
ferent time points (Berns et al., 2007; Paglieri and Castelfranchi,
2008; Marchetti et al., 2009a,b).
The strategies and the behaviors that people adopt to solve
such type of dilemma constitute a topic of interest both for
economists and for psychologists, because they show how the
rational and wise decisions that individuals take about goods of
different nature (health, life habits, money. . . ) fail to withstand
the challenge of time. The interplay between the magnitude of
the outcome, the time delay necessary to obtain the bigger out-
come, and the subjective perception of these two elements make
intertemporal choice a quite complex decision-making process,
far away from the model of the rational homo oeconomicus pro-
posed by classical economic theories. Within this framework,
decision making tends to reach the maximum possible profit, and
the time discount rate is supposed to be constant.
However, evidences showed that people do not always maxi-
mize their profits and they often prefer the minor outcome soon
available, or they decide for the grater outcome available later,
but then they change their mind in the meanwhile, and that the
nature of the time discount rate is hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic
(Ainslie, 1992, 2001). Moreover, the temporal discount rate does
not remain the same for any type of good and for any time interval
(see Frederick et al., 2002).
A key concept to understand the reasons of the inconsistency
of people’s behavior is temporal discounting. The preference
for an outcome close or distant in time is calculated accord-
ing to the value of the single outcome (1 euro vs. 10 euro)
for its delay (a day vs. 1 month). The value of the outcome
soon available makes people shortsighted about the greater ben-
efits they could reach if only they were able to delay gratifi-
cation and to decide for the bigger outcome in the future: in
this sense, their decisions become irrationally myopic (Prelec
and Loewenstein, 1997; Ebert and Prelec, 2007). Such lack of
foresight can be explained considering intertemporal choice as
a complex psychological process, that implies various compo-
nents (see Berns et al., 2007; Kalenscher and Pennartz, 2008),
among which the capacity to delay gratification (Ainslie, 1975,
1992). This component has relevant implications in develop-
mental and educational psychology, because the capacity to
wait in order to satisfy one’s need or desire and to postpone
gratification in order to get a higher reward constitutes a con-
tinuous acquisition across infancy and childhood until adult-
hood and elderly (Green et al., 1994; Read and Read, 2004).
Not surprisingly, the construct of the “delay of gratification”
has become the way intertemporal choice is studied in devel-
opmental psychology. Two experimental procedures are usually
employed: the choice paradigm or “delay choice” (Mischel and
Metzner, 1962) and the waiting paradigm or “delay mainte-
nance” (Mischel, 1974). In the former the participant has to
choose between a smaller but immediate outcome (for exam-
ple, to receive one candy immediately) and a bigger outcome but
delayed over time (for example, three candies next week). In the
latter, the procedure is similar, but the participant can decide at
any time to stop waiting and to get the smaller but immediate
outcome.
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Various researches conducted with these procedures (see for
example Mischel andMetzner, 1962; Schwarz et al., 1983; Mischel
et al., 1989; Shoda et al., 1990; Thompson et al., 1997; Lemmon
and Moore, 2001, 2007) mainly focused on the preschool age,
showing a significant effect of age on the delay of gratification.
Other studies considered the school-age only in a longitudinal
perspective, analyzing the predictivity of the delay of gratification
in preschoolers in various domains, such as cognition and atten-
tion (Mischel and Metzner, 1962; Eigsti et al., 2006), the ability
to resist to temptations in general (Mischel and Gilligan, 1964),
the assumption of responsibility (Stumphauzer, 1972), the adop-
tion of empathic and prosocial behavior (Krueger et al., 1996;
Thompson et al., 1997), the adaptation to the school context
(McIntyre et al., 2006) and academic achievement (Bembenutty
and Karabenick, 2004; Yang and Wang, 2007), the adoption
of successful coping strategies in adolescence and in adulthood
(Mischel et al., 1988; Shoda et al., 1990; Ayduk et al., 2000). The
pioneer work by Mischel and Metzner (1962) is the only one that
investigated the age range from 5 to 12 with a cross-sectional
design.
The ability to delay gratification resulted to be sensitive also
to factors such as gender—females would be more inclined to
postpone gratification—and the degree of emotional involvement
of the mother in the relationship with their child, measured by
the expression of maternal emotions (Jacobsen, 1998). Moreover,
some authors have taken into account the possible links between
the ability to delay gratification and the development of social and
cognitive abilities, such as the tendency to be prosocial and altru-
istic (Thompson et al., 1997; Moore, 2009) and theory of mind
(Moore et al., 1998; Moore and Symons, 2005).
As for social skills, Thompson et al. (1997) and Moore (2009)
proposed a joint study of the ability to delay gratification and
other-oriented preference. They presented preschoolers with a
number of two alternative choices, contrasting an immediate
reward of stickers with four alternatives. The first choice between
one sticker for self now or one each for self and partner was
a simple measure of the tendency to share. The second choice,
instead, examined sharing when there was a cost to self, because
the choice was between two stickers for self now or one each
for self and partner now. The two remaining choices introduced
the time component. The shared delay was a choice between
one sticker for self now or one each for self and partner later:
in this case, the subject did not sacrifice anything, but he/she
had to forego immediate self-gratification in order that the other
might benefit. The final choice was a classical delay of gratifica-
tion, in which the child had to choose between one sticker for
self now or two stickers for self later. Results show that the abil-
ity to delay gratification develops parallel to the ability to make
altruistic choices, and in particular the fourth year of age consti-
tutes a turning point in such a development. This result is very
interesting, because the fourth year of age constitutes a corner-
stone also in the development of theory of mind. Theory of mind
is the ability to interpret and predict our own and others’ behav-
ior in terms of mental states (Premack and Woodruff, 1978). It is
not an “independent” competence, instead it is one of the several
cognitive skills employed in social interactions (Astington, 2003;
German and Hehman, 2006; Massaro and Castelli, 2009; Massaro
et al., 2013a,b, 2014). Initially, theory of mind research focused on
childhood, identifying the steps of its development, mainly using
false belief tasks. More recently, researchers adopted a life span
perspective, considering adults and the elderly (Henry et al., 2006;
Castelli et al., 2010). Results showed that theory of mind is not
an “all or nothing” competence, rather it continues to undergo
changes across life. More specifically, according to Apperly (2012)
the transition from childhood to adulthood may be characterized
by an increase in theory of mind flexibility and speed of usage.
Furthermore, the pattern of correlation of theory of mind with
other socio-cognitive abilities changes across development. In the
light of these recent evidences theory of mind development could
be intended as spiral pathway, where the aspects of competence
and awareness increase cyclically.
To the best of our knowledge, there are few works that have
studied the possible link between intertemporal choice and the-
ory of mind, namely the works by Moore et al. (1998) and Moore
and Symons (2005). The first work tested theory of mind through
classical false belief tasks and evaluated the ability to delay gratifi-
cation with same set of choices of the work by Thompson et al.
(1997). Results showed that in 4-years-old children good per-
formances in false belief tasks were significantly correlated with
the tendency to delay to share in the choice between one sticker
now or one each later, and close to significance with the tendency
to delay to share in the choice between one sticker self now or
one each later. Such findings suggest that a good level of the-
ory of mind supports the child’s ability to take the perspective
of the other person and also to manage it in the future, thus mak-
ing an altruistic choice and delaying gratification too. Moore and
Symons (2005) continued on this path of research, adding also a
new construct, i.e., the quality of attachment. In fact, the ability
to delay gratification is connected to the ability of self-regulation,
which in turn is strongly related to the pattern of attachment.
According to the theory of attachment (Bowlby, 1969, 1973,
1980), humans are characterized by a universal need to create and
maintain a deep emotional relationship with their caregivers. The
aim of the attachment system is the experimentation of security,
which in turn acts as a regulator of the emotional experience. The
most famous research paradigm devised to evaluate attachment is
the Strange Situation (Ainsworth et al., 1971) that has allowed the
identification of three styles of attachment, i.e., secure, insecure-
avoidant, insecure-ambivalent, followed by the disorganized style
identified later by Main and Solomon (1986). The type of attach-
ment is crucial for the subsequent child development, because on
the basis of the quality of the relationship with the caregiver the
child elaborates an “Internal Working Model” (Bowlby, 1973),
i.e., a cognitive representational structure which is linked to the
conception of the Self as worthy of receiving care, basis of self-
esteem, and to the conception of one’s own self-efficacy, basis of
self-confidence. The latter is rooted in the trustful relationship
that children develop with the primary caregiver in the early years
of life.
Jacobsen et al. (1997) were the first to investigate the possi-
ble link between delay of gratification and attachment style. They
found that the quality of the attachment relationship assessed at
12 and 18months of age with the Strange Situation is predictive of
the ability to deal with the classical delay of gratification task at 6
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years of age, with an average waiting time higher for children with
a secure attachment compared to children with insecure attach-
ment. This result confirms the evidence, already present in the
literature, about the difficulty in self-regulation and in the control
of impulsivity for the insecure attached children (see for example,
Lyons-Ruth et al., 1993; Shaw and Vondra, 1995).
Moore and Symons (2005) explored the relationship between
the quality of the attachment relationship at three and a half
years of age and various competences at 4 years of age: theory
of mind (measured as false belief understanding), prosociality
and intertemporal choice (measured with two modified versions
of the delay choice paradigm: two stickers for you now vs. two
stickers to be shared now; two stickers for you now vs. two stick-
ers to be shared in the future), and executive control (measured
by the gift delay paradigm, where the child can receive a gift
only if she/he turns to the wall while the gift is being wrapped).
They found that secure attachment, in addition to being linked
to theory of mind (Fonagy et al., 1997; Meins et al., 2002; Liverta
Sempio et al., 2005), is related to the intertemporal choice and to
executive control. No links between attachment and prosociality
were highlighted.
On the basis of this overview, the goal of our research is to
study the possible link among attachment style, theory of mind
and intertemporal choice in primary school age children with a
cross-sectional design. Our work has two innovative aspects. The
first one is the choice of the age period, because as explained
before the literature about the delay of gratification has focused
mainly on the preschool period. The study of the development of
the ability to delay gratification in primary school-age children is
interesting because during this period formal instruction requires
pupils to improve in their ability to remain focused on cognitive
tasks, avoiding distractions and postponing gratification of other
goals. Therefore, considering 6, 8, and 10 year olds can allow to
observe the possible changes in the delay of gratification over the
entire primary school period. The second one is the focus on the
two core components of intertemporal choice separately, namely
the increase in waiting time and the increase in the magnitude
of the outcome. In fact, in the classical choice paradigm used to
measure intertemporal choice these two components are entan-
gled, because the child or the adult is required to make a choice
between a small outcome immediately or a bigger outcome later.
In this way, no information about the subject’s sensitivity to the
waiting time and to the magnitude of the outcome separately is
provided. The same happens for the other methods used to assess
intertemporal choice. In children the delay maintenance task pro-
vides a measure of the persistence in the decision, and in adults
the classical methods again do not address such two components
separately: in the matching tasks respondents “fill in the blank”
to equate two intertemporal options (100 euro now = . . . in 1
year), in the rating tasks subjects evaluate an outcome occurring
at a particular time by rating its attractiveness or aversiveness,
and in the pricing tasks subjects specify a willingness to pay to
obtain (or avoid) some real or hypothetical outcome occurring at
a particular time (Frederick et al., 2002).
We think that focusing on the two core components of
intertemporal choice separately may be useful to further under-
stand their specific contribution and the strict interplay between
them. In fact, literature about the neural basis of intertemporal
choice has provided strong evidence of the fact that those com-
ponents are processed by specific neural circuits (for a review
see Kalenscher and Pennartz, 2008), although a crucial topic of
debate regards the neural site for the integration of the two sep-
arate neural systems. Roesch and Olson (2005) trained monkeys
in two tasks, one with a variable delay and a fixed reward amount,
and another one with a variable reward, but fixed delay. They
found that reward proximity and quantity are processed by the
same orbitofrontal neurons, implying they may be integrated on
a single-cell level. So, the orbitofrontalcortex (OFC) seems to be
the best candidate for such integration at very deep levels of neu-
roanatomical analyses also in humans. The task devised by Roesch
and Olson (Roesch and Olson, 2005) inspired the task we created
for our research.
AIMS AND HYPOTHESES
The goals of our research are to investigate the two above-
described core components of intertemporal choice separately,
i.e., the increase in waiting time and the increase in the magnitude
of the outcome, and to study them in the primary school-age. We
also aim to explore the possible link between the increase in wait-
ing time and the increase in the magnitude of the outcome and
attachment style, as well as the possible link between the increase
in waiting time and the increase in the magnitude of the outcome
and theory of mind.
We hypothesize that the ability to delay gratification, mea-
sured through the increase in waiting time and the increase in
the magnitude of the outcome, would improve with age because
of the development of the capacity to inhibit immediate grat-
ification and to tolerate the frustration. As regards theory of
mind, measured as the capacity to understand others’ mental
states to predict the behavior (1st and 2nd order false belief
tasks), we hypothesize that it may support children with both
of the measures of intertemporal choice. In fact, the develop-
ment of meta-representational abilities may help to prefigure and
manage the representation of a postponed advantage and drive
the children to delay gratification. For this reason this interac-
tion may depend on age. Conversely, we hypothesize that theory
of mind, measured as a purely metalinguistic ability (metacog-
nitive vocabulary), would not predict the two measures of the
ability to delay gratification because not directly rooted into the
meta-representational mechanism. Finally, we hypothesize that
attachment style to the family and the school caregiver would
predict the ability to delay gratification, measured through the
increase in waiting time but not to the increase in the magnitude
of the outcome, because only the former is closely linked to the
development of trust in other people.
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
Ninety-one children took part in the study. The attended a pub-
lic Primary school in Northern Italy. After the acknowledgement
of the Director of the school to carry on the research, families
were contacted through the teachers and were asked to provide
informed written consent for their children to be enrolled in the
study. No one refused to give the consent. Children were divided
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as follows: the first group, classified as 6-year olds (N = 30, 18
boys, 12 girls,M = 6.4 years, SD = 0.31); the second group clas-
sified as 8-year-olds (N = 29, 17 boys, 12 girls, M = 8.3 years,
SD = 0.31); the last group, classified as 10-year-olds (N = 32, 20
boys, 12 girls,M = 10.4 years, SD = 0.26). Participants belonged
to the middle socio-economic status based on the parents’ edu-
cation and socio-economic level. Children were neither referred
to social services nor reported by teachers for learning and socio-
relational difficulties.
PROCEDURE
Children were submitted to the following battery of tasks. The
intertemporal choice task, appositely devised for the present
research, consists of two procedures: procedure A, based on time
variation, and procedure B, based on outcome variation. Theory
of mind was evaluated with three tasks: a classical 1st order false
belief task (the unexpected transfer task: Wimmer and Perner,
1983), a classical 2nd order false belief task (the ice-cream story:
Perner and Wimmer, 1985), and the metacognitive vocabulary
(Astington and Pelletier, 1998). The attachment style was investi-
gated with the Separation Anxiety Test (SAT) in the family version
and in the school version (Liverta Sempio et al., 2001). Finally,
the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-Revised (PPVT-R) was used
as a language control task (Dunn and Dunn, 1981; Stella et al.,
2000).
All the tasks were submitted in a fixed order, following the
above list. Each child was tested individually in a quiet room
at school, and required about 40–45min to complete the test
session.
TASKS
The intertemporal choice task (IC)
This task was appositely devised for the present research. It has
two innovative aspects. First, it does not offer a single choice
between one outcome now and two or more outcomes later, but
it proposes a continuous set of choices. Second, it assesses the
ability to manage the two components of intertemporal choice
separately, i.e., the entity of the waiting time (procedure A) and
the entity of the outcome (procedure B).
Procedure A.Children were explained that the aim of the first task
was to know how many days, starting from 7 days and decreasing
until 2 days, they would have tolerated to wait in order to get two
candies instead of one candy immediately. So, the set of choices
consisted in a fixed amount of candies (one candy now vs. two
candies later) with a decreasing waiting time (7, 6, 5 days, and so
on). The set of choices started in this way: “Today is Tuesday: I
can give you one candy now or two candies within 7 days, i.e.,
next Tuesday. What do you prefer?” then “Today is Tuesday: I can
give you one candy now or two candies within 6 days, i.e., next
Monday. What do you prefer?” and so on. The task is stopped
once the child decides for the greater outcome later, i.e., two can-
dies in the future. The score is given to the set of choices on a seven
point scale, where one score is given to the absence of temporal
delay, i.e., the child chooses one candy immediately, and seven
is given to the highest temporal delay, i.e., the child chooses two
candies within 7 days.
Procedure B. Children were explained that the aim of the this task
was to know how many candies, starting from two and increas-
ing until seven, they would have considered good enough to
wait for one week to get them. The set of choices consisted in
an increasing amount of candies later on (one candy now vs.
two/three/four/five/six/seven candies in 1 week) within a fixed
waiting time (one week). The set of choices started in this way:
“Today is Tuesday: I can give you one candy now or two can-
dies within 7 days, i.e., next Tuesday. What do you prefer?” then
“Today is Tuesday: I can give you one candy now or three can-
dies within 7 days, i.e., next Tuesday. What do you prefer?” and so
on. The task is stopped once the child decides the sufficient num-
ber of candies to wait for one week. The score is given to the set
of choices on a seven point scale, where one score is given to the
highest number of candies (seven) within one week, and seven to
the lowest number of candies (two) within one week.
The transcription of the answers was performed by two
independent coders. Any discrepancy was discussed and solved
collegially. Two different scores are obtained: the score of the pro-
cedure A is an indicator of the child’s waiting tolerance to get a
bigger outcome, whereas the score of procedure B is an indicator
of the child’s sensitivity to delayed outcome amount.
Children received the amount of candies related to their
choices in each procedure.
Theory of mind tasks
A task exploring the ability to manage verbs referring to men-
tal activities was employed. A first-order and a second-order false
belief tasks supported by illustrations were used to examine chil-
dren’s ability to perform first and second-order levels of recursive
thinking, namely “I think that you think that. . . ” and “I think
that you think that he/she thinks that. . . .” These tasks were chosen
because considered by the literature sufficiently reliable and valid
in measuring the constructs explored (Wellman et al., 2001).
Metacognitive Vocabulary test (METVOC)
TheMetacognitive Vocabulary test (Astington and Pelletier, 1998)
was used to measure children’s competences about mentalistic
verbs that express their own and other people’s mental states, such
as “to understand, to forget, to know” and so on. This task is
based on 12 short stories accompanied by pictures. Children have
to choose which is the best verb that expresses the mental state
of the character, choosing in a set of two alternatives. For exam-
ple: “Dad comes into the room and says: “Time for bed. If it’s sunny
tomorrow, we’ll go to the park.” In the morning John gets out of the
bed and looks out the window: he sees the rain pouring down. “Oh
no” says John, “Look at that! We won’t be going to the park today.”
After the story, the child is asked if John “knows” that it is raining
or if he “remembers” that it is raining. The right answer is that
John “knows.”
Correct answers were coded with 1 point, whereas wrong
answers with 0 point. Children can obtain a total score that ranges
from 0 to 12 points.
First-order false belief task (1st order FB). It is a classical unex-
pected transfer task (Wimmer and Perner, 1983). The story is
about Antonio and Francesco, which are playing with a ball in
a bedroom. The doorbell rings, so Antonio puts the ball in a
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wardrobe and goes to the door. In the meanwhile, Francesco takes
the ball out of the wardrobe and puts it under the bed. The story
ends when Antonio comes back to the room and wants to play
with his ball. At this point the child is asked the following ques-
tions: “Where will Antonio look for the ball?” (First-order false
belief question), “Why?” (Justification question) and two control
questions about memory and reality.
The answers to the two control questions about memory and
reality were used to filter the children’s performance: children
who did not pass them were scored as 0. The test question about
the false belief was scored as 1 if correct and 0 if incorrect. The
justification question was scored 0 if incorrect, 1 if correct but
without references to the mental activity, 2 if correct and with
references to the mental activity.
Second-order false belief task (2nd order FB). It is a classical
unexpected transfer task (Perner and Wimmer, 1985). The story
is about Maria and Giovanna, which are playing in the park when
they see an ice-cream van. Maria wants to get an ice-cream, but
she has no money, so she decides to go home in order to take
the money, being sure that the ice-cream van will remain in the
park. But while Maria is away, Giovanna sees the ice-cream van
moving away and asks to the ice-cream man where he is going.
He says that he is going in front of the school to sell more ice-
creams. While Maria is at home, she sees the ice-cream man and
asks him where he is going, so that she comes to know that he is
moving outside the school. At the end of the story Giovanna goes
to Maria’s house and asks her mother where her friend is: Maria’s
mum answers that Maria is just gone out to buy an ice-cream. At
this point the child is asked the following questions: “Where does
Giovanna think that Maria thinks the ice-cream van is?” (second-
order false belief question), “Why?” (Justification question), and
two control questions about memory and reality. The scoring was
the same as described for the first-order false belief task.
Separation Anxiety Test–family version and school version (F-SAT
and S-SAT)
The Separation Anxiety Test is a semi-projective task that evalu-
ates the child’s mental representation of the attachment style with
the caregiver. The original version was elaborated by Hansburg
(1972) for adolescents between 11 and 17 years, then Klagsbrun
and Bowlby (1976) have adapted this version for children from 4
to 7 years. Their new task consisted of six pictures, each one repre-
senting a situation with a separation from the familiar caregiver:
three situations deal with strong intensity separations, and three
with medium intensity separations. The child is asked to describe
the protagonist’s feelings, to justify them, and to foresee what the
protagonist will do, i.e., the coping strategy of the protagonist.
The Italian version by Liverta Sempio et al. (2001) was used for
this study. This version is the result of an adjustment from the
other versions of the same task (Fonagy et al., 1997; Slough et al.,
1988) and has the advantage of allowing the evaluation of the
quality of the attachment style not only with the family caregiver,
but also with the school caregiver.
The coding system is the one provided by Liverta Sempio
et al. (2001), based on the previous one defined by Slough and
Greenberg (1990) and by Fonagy et al. (1997). This system is
organized on three dimensions: attachment, i.e., the ability to
express vulnerability and need (measured through the three sit-
uations of high intensity of separation); self-confidence, i.e., the
ability to face separation in an autonomous mood (measured
through the three situations of medium intensity of separation)
and avoidance, i.e., the propensity to speak about the separation
(measured through all the six situations of separation). Each par-
ticipant received one score for each dimension. More specifically,
the attachment and self-confidence scales have a score ranging
from 3 to 12 (range 1-4 for each of three situations), while the
avoidance scale has a score ranging from 6 to 18 (range 1-3 for
each of the six situations). Then the total attachment score was
calculated. This final score is the result of the sum of the scores in
the attachment scale and in the self-confidence scale, and of the
sum of the inverse of the avoidance scale, calculated by subtract-
ing this score from the total amount potentially obtainable in this
scale. We decided to use this task because in the literature it has
been successfully employed for the assessment of attachment style
in conjunction with the assessment of theory of mind in samples
of preadolescents (Fonagy et al., 1997; Lecciso et al., 2011).
The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-Revised
The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test—Revised (PPVT—R) is a
standardized test used to measure the receptive vocabulary and it
is useful in order to reveal high or low verbal abilities (Dunn and
Dunn, 1981; Stella et al., 2000).
This test is constituted of 175 items, organized on different
levels of difficulty from simple ones to difficult ones. A series
of pictures were presented to the participant, since each page
included four pictures. The experimenter stated a word, describ-
ing one of the pictures, and asked the child to point to or to say
the number of the picture that the word described. Each child was
not presented with all the items but only with the ones that were
in the critical interval defined by items on an inferior level, the
basal one, and on a superior level, the ceiling one. So for all sub-
jects it was necessary to determine the first item on the basis of
the chronological age, then it was defined the basal level and the
ceiling one. Standard scores range from 40 to 160.
RESULTS
The PPVT-R revealed no significant age differences among the
three age groups. Therefore, the entire sample satisfied the pre-
requisite of adequate language understanding in order to be
submitted to the battery of tasks [F(2, 88) = 2.834 p = 0.064].
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the explored vari-
ables. First, a preliminary evaluation of the link between the two
IC measures as well as the effect of gender and age on them are
presented. Thus, the possible links among IC measures, and lan-
guage variables, theory of mind performance, and attachment
scores are explored. Finally, a general model that overall evalu-
ates the impact of gender and age as well as of theory of mind and
attachment on the IC scores is presented.
The two IC scores were strongly and high significantly cor-
related (r = 0.753, p < 0.001). The more children were able
to wait longer in order to obtain two candies instead of one
immediately, the more they were sensitive to a small increase
of the outcome in order to wait instead of choosing one candy
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Table 1 | Descriptive statistics of the tasks performances.
Age group N Minimum Maximum Mean Std.
deviation
6-years PPVT 30 84 116 103.23 8.557
METVOC 30 7 11 9.67 1.061
1st OR. FB 30 0.00 2.00 1.5333 0.81931
2nd OR. FB 30 0.00 3.00 0.6000 0.96847
F-SAT 30 11 34 27.70 4.728
S-SAT 30 17 35 28.87 4.345
A-IC 30 0 5 3.23 1.633
B-IC 30 0 5 2.77 2
8-years PPVT 29 74 125 109.14 8.963
METVOC 29 9 12 10.83 0.928
1st OR. FB 29 2.00 3.00 2.1034 0.30993
2nd OR. FB 29 0.00 3.00 0.8276 1.03748
F-SAT 29 20 36 29.72 3.788
S-SAT 29 16 36 29.17 4.706
A-IC 29 0 5 4.10 1.589
B-IC 29 0 5 3.86 1.642
10-years PPVT 32 75 130 108.63 13.445
METVOC 32 10 12 11.53 0.671
1st OR. FB 32 2.00 3.00 2.3125 0.47093
2nd OR. FB 32 0.00 3.00 1.2500 1.24434
F-SAT 32 21 34 30.66 3.798
S-SAT 32 22 34 30.62 2.768
A-IC 32 0 5 4.38 1.238
B-IC 32 0 5 4.66 1.004
immediately. The T-test for paired samples did not show any sig-
nificant difference between these two performances (p = 0.29).
Anovas showed that Gender did not influence the IC perfor-
mances (p > 0.15), whereas an age effect on both A- and B-
IC scores was revealed [respectively, F(2, 88) = 4.892, p < 0.05;
F(2, 88) = 10.817, p < 0.001]. In both cases, the 10 year olds wait
significantly more than children aged 6 (respectively, p < 0.05
and p < 0.001).
The bivariate correlations highlighted several positive and sig-
nificant links among IC scores and the other variables explored
(see Table 2).
Both the IC-A (waiting tolerance) and the IC-B (sensitivity to
delayed outcome amount) were significantly and positively cor-
related with, F-SAT, S-SAT, METVOC and 1st order FB. Partial
correlations controlling for age were performed again revealing
that some significant links were independent by developmental
processes (see Table 3). IC-A correlated with, F-SAT, S-SAT and
with 1st order FB. The IC-B correlated with 1st order FB. Given
the absence of correlations between the measures of intertempo-
ral choice and 2nd order false belief understanding, the latter was
excluded from subsequent analyzes.
On the basis of these preliminary results we run a Univariate
General Linear Model in order to explore the effect of age on
the intertemporal choice performance obtained by summing the
two IC scores, controlling for F-Sat, S-SAT METVOC, 1st FB
understanding, Although the unique contribute of age was highly
Table 2 | Correlations among intertemporal choice measures and the
other study variables.
F-SAT S-SAT METVOC 1st order FB 2nd order FB
IC-A 0.387** 0.255* 330** 0.390** 0.072
IC-B 0.251* 0.243* 0.425** 0.494** 0.090
*p < 0.05 level.
**p < 0.01 level.
Table 3 | Partial correlations among intertemporal choice measures
and the other study variables controlling for age.
F-SAT S-SAT METVOC 1st order FB 2nd order FB
IC-A 0.323** 0.210* 0.178 0.283** −0.009
IC-B 0.131 0.179 0.188 0.340** −0.032
*p < 0.05 level.
**p < 0.01 level.
significant, accounting for the 14.8% of the total variance of the
intertemporal choice performance [F(2, 88) = 8.816, p < 0.001,
θ = 0.967], the covariates share enough variance in commonwith
intertemporal choice, cancelling themain effect of age. In particu-
lar, only the first-order false belief understanding seems to explain
a significant part of the variance of the intertemporal choice,
net of other covariates [F(2, 82) = 6.512, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.074,
θ = 0.713].
To examine the unique contribution of age, attachment and
theory of mind in the explanation of the IC-A and IC-B, a three
steps hierarchical multiple regression analysis was performed. In
particular, step 1 introduces the age in the model, step 2 the mea-
sures of attachment (F-SAT and S-SAT) and step 3 the measures
of theory of mind (1st order FB and METVOC). With regard to
IC-A measure, in all three models a significant change in R2 was
found (see Table 4).
Step 1 indicated that age significantly predicted the intertem-
poral choice [F(1, 89) = 9.46, p < 0.01, β = 0.31, t = 3.08, p <
0.01]. In step 2 [F(1, 89) = 7.25, p < 0.001], although the age
continued to be a significant predictor (ß = 0.21, t = 2.10, p <
0.05), the F-SAT significantly contributed to the explanation of
intertemporal choice (ß= 0.32, t = 3.20, p< 0.01). Finally, in step
3 [F(1, 89) = 6.16, p < 0.001], 1st order FB predicted intertempo-
ral choice (ß = 0.27, t = 2.41, p < 0.05). Even the F-SAT con-
tinued to have a significant role (ß = 0.24, t = 2.56, p < 0.05),
while the age ceased to contribute to the explanation of the vari-
ance (ß = 0.01, t = 0.04, p = 0.971). In reference to IC-B, only
the model 1 and the model 3 determine a significant change in R2
(see Table 5).
More specifically, in step 1 [F(1, 89) = 23.60, p < 0.001], the
age explained a significant part of the variance of the intertem-
poral choice (ß = 0.46, t = 4.86, p < 0.001). In step 2 [F(3, 87) =
9.11, p < 0.001], the measures of attachment did not contribute
to the explanation of variance in a statistically significant manner
(F-SAT: ß = 0.08, t = 0.69, p = 0.49; S-SAT: ß = 0.14, t = 1.35,
p = 0.18), leaving age as the only predictor (ß = 0.41, t = 4.16,
p < 0.001). Finally, in step 3 [F(5, 85) = 8.67, p < 0.001], the
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Table 4 | Model and R2 Change summary predicting IC-A.
Model R R square Adjusted R square Std. error of the estimate Change statistics
R square change F change df1 df2 Sig. F change
1 0.310a 0.096 0.086 1.486 0.096 9.461 1 89 0.003
2 0.447b 0.200 0.172 1.414 0.104 5.649 2 87 0.005
3 0.516c 0.266 0.223 1.370 0.066 3.827 2 85 0.026
aPredictors: (Constant), Age.
bPredictors: (Constant), Age, F-SAT, S-SAT.
cPredictors: (Constant), Age, F-SAT, S-SAT, METVOC, 1st ORDER FB.
Table 5 | Model and R2 Change summary predicting IC-B.
Model R R square Adjusted R square Std. error of the estimate Change statistics
R square change F change df1 df2 Sig. F change
1 0.458a 0.210 0.201 1.581 0.210 23.603 1 89 0.000
2 0.489b 0.239 0.213 1.569 0.029 1.682 2 87 0.192
3 0.581c 0.338 0.299 1.481 0.099 6.338 2 85 0.003
aPredictors: (Constant), Age.
bPredictors: (Constant), Age, F-SAT, S-SAT.
cPredictors: (Constant), Age, F-SAT, S-SAT, METVOC, 1st ORDER FB.
first-order false belief understanding became the only significant
predictor of intertemporal choice (ß = 0.32, t = 3.07, p < 0.01).
DISCUSSION
This research aimed to investigate intertemporal choice in pri-
mary school age children. Intertemporal choice was operational-
ized as waiting tolerance and sensitivity to delayed outcome
amount in order to explore the different single components—
namely time and entity of the outcome—which are stately inter-
related in this type of decisionmaking dilemma. Furthermore, the
effect of age as well as the predictivity of attachment and theory
of mind on intertemporal choice measures were evaluated.
The results show that the two components of intertemporal
choice are strongly correlated, in the sense that the more children
have a high waiting tolerance in order to obtain a little more than
what they could obtain immediately, the more they are sensitive
to small increase in the entity of the delayed outcome. Conversely,
the children who show a low waiting tolerance are those who
need a remarkable increase of the amount of the delayed outcome
in order to wait for it. This result is interesting at least for two
reasons: first, it reveals a behavioral coherence in the intertem-
poral choice measures, supporting the idea that the coordination
of the representations both of the time waiting and of the entity
of the outcome is a crucial aspect for this decisional dilemma.
Second, this correlation is a new evidence in the literature about
intertemporal choice. In fact, the majority of the studies high-
lights the absence of a link between the two classical ways to
assess intertemporal choice (delay choice and delay maintenance)
(Schwarz et al., 1983) as also confirmed by a recent review about
the convergent validity of multi-method measures of delay toler-
ance (Duckworth and Kern, 2011). So, our results are in contrast
with the main findings of the literature. They help to renew the
questions about what the tasks actually measure and how these
measurements interface with the constructs theoretically devel-
oped. In fact, it is not so clear if the traditional delay choice task
and the delay maintenance task actually measure two aspects of
the same competence. In the first case, the propensity to make an
intertemporal choice is measured; in the second case, the ability
to maintain the choice done and so to tolerate waiting is mea-
sured. In our work, instead, we measure the tolerance of waiting
as well as the cost of such tolerance, adding evidence on children
to the result provided on monkeys by Roesch and Olson (Roesch
and Olson, 2005). Our result of the strong correlation supports
behaviorally the evidence that separate neural activations process-
ing time and amount find a synthesis in the OFC. Furthermore,
the two measures of intertemporal choice employed, although
correlated, show the differential effects that the other investigated
variables (in particular attachment) have on each of them.
We found an effect of age on intertemporal choice coherent
with the literature. Interestingly, this effect appears when it is eval-
uated alone, and it disappears when controlling for other abilities.
This is interesting because it shows that, on one hand, the simple
increase of age influences the ability of intertemporal choice and,
on the other hand, the development of specific cognitive abili-
ties in this period is so significant for the ability under study to
neutralize the effect of age.
The quality of the attachment style influences intertemporal
choice: this result is interesting because it extends to the school-
age period the evidence found in the preschool age by Jacobsen
et al. (1997) and Moore and Symons (2005). But our result adds
two new evidences. First, attachment influences one specific com-
ponent of intertemporal choice, namely the tolerance of waiting
time. In other words, not only secure children are better able
to delay gratification compared to insecure children, but they
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also tolerate a longer waiting time compared to insecure chil-
dren. This result is really pertinent, because it confirms the role of
attachment on self-control, which is necessary to tolerate waiting,
and this is exactly the component of intertemporal choice mea-
sured with the procedure A of our task. Second, only attachment
style with the family caregiver but not with the school caregiver
has this effect, thus confirming the crucial role of the primary
caregiving in shaping a trustful relationship that is a prerequi-
site for self-confidence. However, despite the important role of
attachment on the ability to delay gratification, attachment alone
does not explain the age variability. So, it surely is a compo-
nent that deserves to be considered to explain children’s ability
in intertemporal choice, though not enough to account for the
entire process.
Finally, theory of mind has an effect on both components
of intertemporal choice, i.e., the tolerance to the waiting time
and the sensitivity to the outcome increase. This result is in line
with the results of the literature (Moore et al., 1998; Moore and
Symons, 2005) and is really interesting given the type of task
we have devised to study the two components of intertempo-
ral choice separately. In fact, this result supports the idea that
the separate processing of the two components of intertemporal
choice arrive at a point of synthesis in the site of the OFC, because
OFC is one of the neural sites of theory of mind processing
(Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2010).
Theory of mind, measured as the ability to explicit the pres-
ence of a recursive thought, makes the effect of age null. We
expected that 2nd order false belief reasoning had on primary
school-age children the analogous effect that the 1st order false
belief reasoning has on preschoolers, because the school-age
period is the sensible period for the development and solidi-
fication of this more complex level of recursive thinking, but
this was not the case. Probably such a level of complex meta-
representation is not necessary to manage the task of intertem-
poral choice, where the participant has to articulate only a single
perspective on reality, for which the first order false belief under-
standing is enough.
Concluding, the intertemporal choice is confirmed as a com-
plex psychological process, which involves various abilities. We
have showed the relevance of cognitive as well as emotional
dimensions in this process, which deserve future investigations. In
fact, one limitation of this study is the study of theory of mind as a
purely cognitive ability. So, a promising strategy of future research
could be focusing on the different components of theory of mind,
adding the analyses of “affective” theory of mind to the analyses
of the more cognitive one investigated here. A second limita-
tion is that among the variables belonging to the family context
we considered only the attachment style. Other variables in this
domain deserve future investigation, for example the educational
style of the family for what concerns specifically the habits and
rules regarding the delay of gratification. Finally, we employed
a cross-sectional design to examine an age range that has been
quite neglected so far. It could be interesting to devise longitu-
dinal studies (similar to those on preschoolers described in the
introduction) to follow the subsequent development of the delay
of gratification and its predictive role on other socio-cognitive
competences in adolescence. In fact, we think that this age period
is particularly challenging for the evolution of the biological and
psychosocial factors underlying intertemporal choice, and so our
study could represent a first step in this direction.
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